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EVERYTHING OLD IS NEW AGAIN:
JUSTICE SCALIA'S ACTIVIST
ORIGINALISM IN SCHRIRO V. SUMMERLIN
Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S.Ct. 2519 (2004).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Schriro v. Summerlin,l the Supreme Court held by a five-to-four
margin that the rules announced in Ring v. Arizona 2 and Apprendi v. New
Jersey3 will not apply retroactively on collateral review of cases finally
decided prior to those decisions. Thus, although the Supreme Court has
declared the sentencing scheme under which Warren Summerlin was
sentenced to death unconstitutional, Summerlin's sentence will stand
because he exhausted all of his direct appeals before the Court nullified the
sentencing scheme.
This Note will argue that Schriro is indefensible: the decision is a
jurisprudential failure that misconstrues the relevant precedent in the areas
of the Sixth Amendment, habeas retroactivity, and the Eighth Amendment.
Further, Justice Scalia's majority opinion privileges finality over justice and
makes a virtue out of federal deference to unconstitutional state court
decisions and laws. Finally, there is no compelling policy justification for
the decision. Rather, as Justice Breyer noted in'dissent, the retroactive
application of Ring and Apprendi would only minimally disrupt state
criminal justice systems. For all of these reasons, the Court should overrule
itself and reject Schriro as soon as possible.
II. BACKGROUND
The Court confronted a seemingly straightforward question in Schriro:
"whether Ring v. Arizona... applies retroactively to cases already final on
direct review. ' 4 However, this apparent simplicity conceals the fact that
124 S.Ct. 2519 (2004).
2 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
3
4

530 U.S. 466 (2000).
Schriro, 124 S. Ct. at 2521.
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Schriro involved several intricate bodies of law and posed a difficult and
multi-faceted jurisprudential problem. First, the current law on habeas
retroactivity is a web of inconsistent-and at times, virtually incoherentprecedent and ambiguous statutory language. 5 Moreover, the Sixth
Amendment rules announced in Ring and its parent case, Apprendi, present
further analytical complications since the Court did not address how either
decision impacts habeas adjudication. Because Schriro involved capital
punishment, the Court's ruling also implicates such Eighth Amendment
concerns as proportionality, fairness, and accuracy. 6
As Schriro
demonstrates, Sixth and Eighth Amendment issues grow considerably more
complex when they appear in conjunction.7 Ultimately, though, the central
issue presented by Schriro was the interaction between habeas retroactivity
and the Sixth Amendment.
A. HABEAS RETROACTIVITY
While the Court's Sixth Amendment precedents are ambiguous, the
governing law on retroactivity is even muddier. An amalgam of statutory
enactments, judicial precedents, and constitutional text, habeas retroactivity
is an exceptionally convoluted body of law.
1. HabeasHistory to 1867
The Constitution provides that "[t]he privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or
Invasion the public Safety may require it."'8 Curiously, this negative
reference in the Suspension Clause is the only allusion in the Constitution
to the "Great Writ." 9 At common law during the period of the
Constitution's framing, most petitioners sought habeas relief as a means of
5 See, e.g., A. Christopher Bryant, Retroactive Application of "New Rules" and the
Antiterrorism andEffective DeathPenalty Act, 70 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1 (2002); Ethan Isaac
Jacobs, Note, Is Ring Retroactive?, 103 CoLUM. L. REv. 1805 (2003).
6 See generally THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES (Hugo
Adam Bedau ed., 1997) [hereinafter THE DEATH PENALTY].
7 See generally David R. Dow, Teague and Death: The Impact of Current Retroactivity
Doctrine on CapitalDefendants, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 23 (1991); Steven M. Goldstein,
ChippingAway at the Great Writ: Will Death Sentenced FederalHabeas Corpus Petitioners
Be Able to Seek and Utilize Changes in the Law?, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 357
(1991); Sarah C. S. McLaren, Comment, Was Death Different Then Than It Is Now? The
Opportunity Presentedto the Supreme Court by Summerlin v. Stewart, 88 MINN. L. REv.
1731 (2004); Karl N. Metzner, Note, Retroactivity, Habeas Corpus, and the Death Penalty:
An Unholy Alliance, 41 DUKE L.J. 160 (1991).
8 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
9 Jordan Steiker, Incorporatingthe Suspension Clause: Is There a ConstitutionalRight to
FederalHabeas Corpusfor State Prisoners?,92 MICH. L. REv. 862, 862 (1994).

20051

SCHRIRO v. SUMMERLIN

challenging pretrial imprisonment. 10 Following the framing, the first
Congress limited the federal writ's scope to federal prisoners. 1
In contrast to Congress's early reluctance to grant a broadly applicable
right of habeas corpus for state prisoners, by the mid-nineteenth century the
Supreme Court had established that the Constitution guaranteed some
version of the federal habeas remedy in state courts. 12 During this period,
Congress expanded federal habeas in response to specific conflicts between
state and federal governments, and as such tensions intensified prior to the
Civil War the writ increasingly became an instrument for enforcing national
policies. 3 Still, throughout the antebellum period,
the use of federal habeas
4
by state prisoners remained limited in scope.'
2. Habeasfrom the 1867 Act to the Warren Court
The writ's narrow compass changed dramatically after the Civil War,
when Congress for the first time made federal habeas relief generally
available to state prisoners.' 5 In 1868, the Supreme Court affirmed the
constitutionality of this "expansive view, 16 toward the availability of the
federal habeas writ, holding in Ex parte McCardle that the 1867 statute
expanding habeas review "brings within the habeas corpus jurisdiction of
every court and of every judge every possible case of privation of liberty
contrary to the National Constitution, treaties or laws. It is impossible to
widen this jurisdiction.' 17 But even as the Court asserted the general
availability of federal habeas relief to state prisoners, it also held that courts
should actually grant the writ only where a state prisoner
had been
8
convicted by a trial court that did not possess jurisdiction.'
For nearly a century after McCardle, however, the Court gradually
expanded the writ's application, stating that habeas should be available
whenever a prisoner's conviction violated his constitutional rights, and9
habeas offered the only possibility for the vindication of those rights.'
This growth in the scope of federal habeas review culminated in the Court's
'Id. at 864.
" Id. at 865 (citing First Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82 (1789)).
12 Id. at 878; see, e.g., Exparte Watkins, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 568 (1833); Exparte Bollman,
8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807); Exparte Burford, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448 (1806).
'3 Steiker, supranote 9, at 881-82.
14 Id. at 878.
5 Id. at 865 (citing Judiciary Act, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385-86 (1867)).
16 Goldstein, supra note 7, at 358.
'" Exparte McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318, 325-26 (1868) (emphases omitted).
IS Bryant, supranote 5, at 5 (quoting Exparte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 375 (1879)).
19Id. at 5-6 (citing Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 105 (1942)).
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landmark 1953 decision Brown v. Allen. 20 In Brown, the Court decisively
announced that the balance of power in the habeas context, which had once
clearly favored the state courts, now rested with reviewing federal courts. 2 1
Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion stated that federal courts owed no
deference to state courts' holdings on questions of federal law, as "it is
precisely these questions that the federal judge [must] decide. 22 In effect,
Brown empowered federal district courts to police the state courts, ensuring
that they faithfully applied Supreme Court precedent.23
The expansion of federal habeas took on added significance during the
decade and a half that followed Brown, as the Warren Court announced a
host of rules of criminal procedure.24 This confluence of new constitutional
rules and broader habeas authority contributed substantially to the dramatic
increase in the caseload of the federal courts that began in the early 1960s
and continues today. The proliferation of new rules of criminal procedure
also raised an important
question: when could a prisoner invoke these rules
26
in the habeas context?
3. RetroactivityBefore Teague
In a series of decisions issued throughout the 1960s,27 the Court
formulated a three-factor test for the analysis of habeas retroactivity. The
Court summarized the test in Stovall v. Denno,28 where the retroactivity
analysis focused on "(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b)
20 344 U.S. 443 (1953); Bryant, supranote 5, at 6.

Bryant, supranote 5, at 6-8.
Brown, 344 U.S. at 506.
23 Bryant, supranote 5, at 8.
24 See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (state prisoner's failure to appeal
conviction does not constitute waiver of right to federal habeas relief); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (requiring states to provide counsel for indigent
defendants); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (prohibiting the admission at trials of
evidence obtained by unconstitutional searches).
21
22

25 See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 53-123

(1996).
26 See Bryant, supra note 5, at 9.
27 See, e.g., Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966) (barring retroactive application
of Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),
which require that police provide pre-interrogation notifications of right to remain silent);
Tehan v. United States ex reL Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966) (prohibiting retroactive application
of Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), which held that adverse comment by judge or
prosecutor on defendant's failure to testify violates Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965) (prohibiting the retroactive
application of Mapp, 367 U.S. 643).
28 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
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the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old
standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive
application of the new standards. 29 Moreover, because "the way in which
these factors combine must inevitably vary with the dictate involved," and
because each new rule presents a unique combination of the three factors in
the Stovall test, "[t]he retroactivity or nonretroactivity of a rule is not
automatically determined by the provision of the Constitution on which the
dictate is based., 30 Under the Stovall regime, federal courts hearing habeas
claims possessed plenary authority in determining whether to apply a new
constitutional rule retroactively. 31 With respect to new-rule retroactivity,
then, habeas was all but indistinguishable from direct review. Thus, the
expansion of habeas perfectly mirrored the Warren Court's
contemporaneous promulgation of new rules.
4. Teague v. Lane
a. Teague background
The Stovall three-factor test had governed habeas retroactivity for
roughly two decades when, in 1987, the Court broadened Stovall's
guarantee of habeas retroactivity.32 Its decision in Griffith v. Kentucky
explicitly stated that new constitutional rules would always apply
retroactively to habeas claims if the conviction under appeal was not finally
decided-i.e., the petitioner had not exhausted his direct appeals-at the
time of the new rule's exposition.33 Thus in Griffith, for the first time, the
Court mandated retroactive application of new constitutional rules under
certain circumstances. So two years later, when the Court announced its
decision in Teague v. Lane,34 the aggressiveness with which Justice
O'Connor's plurality opinion sought to limit retroactivity marked a radical
new direction in the Court's habeas jurisprudence.35

29 Id.at

297.

30Id.(quoting Johnson, 384 U.S. at 728).
31 Dow, supra note 7, at 34 ("The Court used this test irrespective of whether the case
was before the Court on direct appeal or collateral review, and it produced a series of
somewhat ad hoc rulings.").
32 Bryant, supra note 5, at 10.
33479 U.S. 314, 322 (1987).
34 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
35 One indication of Teague's radicalism is the abundance of scholarship devoted to the
elucidation of its holding. For a representative sample of much of this scholarship, see
Bryant, supranote 5, at 9 n.39.
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In Teague, the Justices confronted the following situation: an Illinois
jury convicted the petitioner, an African-American man, of multiple counts
of murder and armed robbery.36 Teague's prosecutor had used all of his ten

peremptory challenges to strike African-American prospective jurors, and
Teague's counsel moved for a mistrial, arguing that the selection process
violated Teague's right to be tried by a jury representative of his
community.37 The trial court denied the motion and the appellate court
affirmed, rendering Teague's conviction final. 38
Teague reprised his representative-jury argument in a petition for
federal habeas relief.39 Although the district court was sympathetic to the
core of his claim, it ruled against him, finding itself bound by both Supreme
Court and Seventh Circuit precedent.40 On appeal, Teague again reiterated
his earlier argument. 41 This time he met with success, as a panel held that
the jury selection process had violated the fair-cross-section requirement,
thus presenting a prima facie case of impermissible racial discrimination. 42
However, when the court of appeals reconsidered Teague's petition en
banc, it overturned the panel's decision. 43 The circuit court postponed
rehearing pending the Supreme Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky.44
Batson, in turn, overruled some of the precedent on which the district court
had relied in rejecting Teague's initial petition.4 5 Nevertheless, the circuit
court once again denied Teague's fair-cross-section claim, stating that the
fair-cross-section requirement should be limited to jury venire.46 It also
rejected his new Batson argument on the grounds that another intervening
decision, Allen v. Hardy,47 precluded the retroactive application of Batson
on collateral review.48

36 Teague, 489 U.S. at 292-93.
37 Id. at 293.
38

id.

39 Id.
41

Id.
Id. at 294.

42

id.

40

43 Id.; United States ex rel. Teague v. Lane, 779 F.2d 1332 (7th Cir. 1985).
44 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
45 Batson established that a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude

potential jurors solely on the basis of their race violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 96.
46 Teague, 489 U.S. at 294.
4' 478 U.S. 255 (1986).
48 Teague, 489 U.S. at 294 (citing Teague v. Lane, 820 F.2d 832, 834 n.4 (7th Cir.
1987)). Teague also argued that he had presented a valid Equal Protection claim under the
law that governed his case at the time his conviction became final. Id. at 297-99.

2005]

SCHRIRO v. SUMMERLIN

In his habeas petition to the Supreme Court, Teague presented two
arguments implicating retroactivity concerns: 1) that the Court should
retroactively apply Batson; and 2) that the reasoning behind the Court's
fair-cross-section precedent mandated the establishment of a new rule
extending the requirement to the petit jury.49 Writing for a majority of the
Court, Justice O'Connor dispensed with Teague's Batson claim on the
grounds that Allen v. Hardy had explicitly and conclusively barred
retroactive application of Batson.50 Justice O'Connor also declined to
announce the new, broader fair-cross-section rule requested by Teague. I
Although a majority of the Court joined her in this result, only three of her
fellow Justices concurred in the reasoning that supported it.52 Nevertheless,
over the past fifteen years, the new-rule dicta included in Justice
53
O'Connor's plurality opinion have come to govern habeas retroactivity.
The framework that Justice O'Connor promulgated in Teague greatly
limited the circumstances under which new constitutional rules of criminal
procedure would have retroactive application in the habeas context. 4 But
before announcing this far-reaching change in retroactivity doctrine, Justice
O'Connor provided a brief discussion of her theory's putative ancestry,
which occupied a central place in her justification of the rule. 55 Here,
Justice O'Connor positioned herself as the intellectual heir to the second
Justice John Marshall Harlan, who had attempted, in several concurrences
and dissents in the 1960s and 1970s, to frame a more systematic approach
to habeas retroactivity.5 6 For several reasons, Justice Harlan found the
three-prong Stovall test a wholly unsatisfactory approach to habeas
retroactivity. First, he believed that the test discouraged consistent
application, because it allowed individual courts excessive discretion in
determining new-rule retroactivity." Justice Harlan also objected to the
Stovall rule on the basis of federalism, because to the extent that it
expanded federal courts' ability to overturn state court verdicts, it also
undermined state courts' authority.5 8 Moreover, Justice Harlan felt that the
expansive scope of federal habeas caused diminished confidence in
49 Id. at 294, 298.
50

Id. at 296.

51

Id.

52

Id. at 292.

53 See Schriro v. Sunmerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2522 (2004).
54 Teague, 489 U.S. at 309-13.
15

Id. at 299-310.

See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 681-95 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring);
Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 256-69 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
57 Desist, 394 U.S. at 263-65 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
58 Id. at 261 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
56
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convictions and sentences, which he saw as problematic from the
perspectives of both the public at large and the convicted.5 9 Justice Harlan
therefore proposed his own retroactivity regime to remedy these perceived
problems.
First, in his dissent in Desist v. United States, Justice Harlan argued
that because the writ "seeks to assure that no man has been incarcerated
under a procedure which creates an impermissibly large risk that the
innocent will be convicted.., all 'new' constitutional rules which significantly improve the pre-existing fact-finding procedures are to be
retroactively applied on habeas." 60 Two years later, Justice Harlan espoused
a more detailed rule. 61 He proposed that new rules should not be
retroactively applied to the habeas claims of petitioners whose convictions
became final prior to the new rules' issuance, except under two
circumstances. 62 Justice Harlan's regime allowed retroactive application 1)
of "'substantive due process' rules that place... certain kinds of...
conduct beyond the power of law-making authority to proscribe"6 3; and 2)
those procedures that.., are 'implicit in
"for claims of nonobservance of
' 64
the concept of ordered liberty.'

Like Justice Harlan, Justice O'Connor emphasized the finality of state
court judgments and comity between state and federal courts.65 These
shared concerns led her to claim that she was adopting Justice Harlan's
66wih
some
albeit with sm
retroactivity framework for habeas review,
modifications.
b. Teague test
According to Justice O'Connor, "a case announces a new rule if the
result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's
conviction became final."67 Justice O'Connor then described a retroactivity
test that, like Justice Harlan's, included two exceptions to the general
nonretroactivity presumption.68 First, she reiterated Justice Harlan's first
" Mackey, 401 U.S. at 690 (Harlan, J., concurring) (citing Sanders v. United States, 373
U.S. 1, 24-25 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
60 Desist, 394 U.S. at 262 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
61Mackey, 401 U.S. at 692-94 (Harlan, J., concurring).
62 Id.at 692 (Harlan, J., concurring).
63Id. (Harlan, J., concurring).
64 Id.at 693 (Harlan, J., concurring) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937)).
65 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308 (1989).
66 Id at 310.
67 Id. at 301.
68 See infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
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exception, allowing retroactive application of new "substantive" rules, but
noted that it was not relevant to the facts of the case before her. 69 For the
second exception, Justice O'Connor proposed a test that "combine[d] the
accuracy element of Desist... with the Mackey requirement that the
procedure at issue must implicate the fundamental fairness of the trial. 7 °
More specifically, the second prong of the Teague test gives retroactive
effect only "to those new procedures without which the likelihood of an
accurate conviction is seriously diminished. 71 Teague thus fundamentally
altered the approach that it purported to adopt, de-emphasizing Justice
Harlan's concern for basic fairness and stressing instead habeas
retroactivity's administrative costs to state courts and its detriments to the
constitutional principles of federalism. 72 Justice O'Connor explicitly
disclaimed any opinion on the applicability of her rule to the capital
sentencing context, although she did note her disagreement with Justice
Stevens's suggestion, in his concurrence, "that the finality concerns
underlying Justice Harlan's approach to retroactivity are limited to 'making
convictions final,' and
are therefore 'wholly inapplicable to the capital
73
sentencing context."'
5. Post-Teague
Several months after deciding Teague, the Court affirmed Justice
O'Connor's retroactivity formula and extended it to the capital sentencing
context in Penry v. Lynaugh.74 The Court had yet to explain, however,
exactly what defined a rule as "new" for Teague purposes. In Penry,
Justice O'Connor acknowledged the difficulty involved in determining
whether a particular case announced a new rule.7 s Moreover, because the
Teague test was itself so new, its impact on the retroactive availability of
constitutional rules remained unclear: if courts defined the "new rule"
category expansively, this would decrease the likelihood that Supreme
Court decisions could be retroactively applied. Conversely, if either of
Teague's exceptions to the prohibition on "new rule" retroactivity was
'9 Teague, 489 U.S. at 311. Justice O'Connor did not comment on the "substantive" rule

exception's validity.
70 Id. at 312.

71 Id. at 313 (emphasis added).
72 Id. at 309-10. At the risk of engaging in armchair psychology, this emphasis may
reflect Justice O'Connor's own experience as a state judge and legislator. Perhaps
coincidentally, the Arizona sentencing scheme at issue in Ring and Schriro became law
while O'Connor was the Republican Leader of the Arizona State Senate.
73 Id. at 314 n.2 (quoting id. at 321, n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
74 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
75 Id. at 314 (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 301).
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construed broadly, this would necessarily expand the universe of
constitutional rules that apply retroactively.
During the following term, the Court eliminated some of these
ambiguities. In three decisions that dealt with habeas retroactivity in the
capital sentencing context, the Supreme Court addressed several ambiguous
aspects of Teague.76 Specifically, the Court clarified the "new rule"
category and refined its second exception to nonretroactivity. In Butler v.
McKellar, the Court reiterated Teague's emphasis on the challenges posed
to state courts by the retroactive application of federal decisions to state
verdicts under collateral attack.77 Thus, Chief Justice Rehnquist held that
Teague's "new rule" concept "validates reasonable, good-faith
interpretations of existing precedents made by state courts even though they
are shown to be contrary to later decisions." 78 In Saffle v. Parks, issued on
the same day as Butler, Justice Kennedy made it clear that the Court was
adopting Teague's narrow "fairness and accuracy" reading of Justice
Harlan's "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" exception to the ban on
habeas retroactivity. 79 Thus, these post-Teague rulings codified a dramatic
reduction in the scope of habeas retroactivity. As one scholar has observed,
"by expansively defining when a decision announces a new rule and by
narrowly circumscribing the reach of the implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty exception," Butler, Saffle, and Sawyer v. Smith guaranteed that the
outcomes of future habeas petitions would be increasingly influenced by
"fortuities in the timing
and pace of litigation which are beyond the
80
individual's control.,
The next watershed event in federal habeas law occurred in 1996,
when Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA).8' AEDPA's drafters were chiefly concerned with procedural
aspects of habeas corpus; the Act expedited the habeas process, limited the
number of petitions prisoners could file, and imposed firm deadlines on
filing. 82 However, AEDPA also substantively modified the scope of federal
habeas jurisdiction.8 3 In addition, although AEDPA did not specifically
address retroactivity, it did promulgate a new standard for the grant of
76

See Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990);

Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990).
" 494 U.S. at 413-14.
78

Id. at 414.

79 Saffle, 494 U.S. at 495.

Goldstein, supra note 7, at 401-02.
81 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 101-08, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
82 See Larry Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BuFF. L. REv. 381,
80

386-97 (1996).
83 These modifications are discussed in detail in id. at 398-411.
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federal habeas to state prisoners. Under AEDPA, federal courts should
grant the writ in such cases only under two conditions, where the state court
proceedings:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of
the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination
of the
84
facts in light of the evidence present in the State court proceeding.

Observing that the first condition resembled the broad outlines of the
Teague test, scholars and practitioners have questioned whether it simply
a fundamentally altered Justice
44,85
"codifie[d]
the Teague doctrine, or instead
O'Connor's test. Certainly, AEDPA addressed the problem of habeas
retroactivity in a wholly different manner than the Court had done in
Teague. After AEDPA, in the words of Larry Yackle, "[t]he availability of
federal habeas jurisdiction no longer turns on a strained attempt to decide
whether a claim depends on 'new' law. 86 Instead, the new Section 2254(d)
calls on the federal courts to directly confront challenged state court
decisions and evaluate their
correctness. 87 Such, at least, was the apparent
88

mandate of AEDPA's text.
However, prior to Schriro, the Court had yet to clarify the relationship
between the statutory text and its own readings of the Constitution. In fact,
because Section 2254(d)(1) emphasized that the relevant federal law ' in
89
habeas adjudication was that "determined by the Supreme Court,
AEDPA effectively left the question of how such law was "determined" to
the Court itself. This ambiguity, in turn, begged the question of what
defined a given constitutional rule as "new," insofar as it required the Court
to decide whether and when the rule cited by a habeas petitioner had been
"determined."
In 2000, the Court addressed these ambiguities without fully resolving
them. 90 Once again, Justice O'Connor penned the controlling opinion. In
her view, a state court decision was "contrary to" federal law-and thus
open to collateral attack-either "if the state court arrives at a conclusion

14

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2000).

85 Yackle, supra note 82, at 416.
86 Id. at 418.
87 Id. at 419.
88 AEDPA also suggested, without stating outright, that federal habeas courts should
review state court interpretations of federal law de novo. See Bryant, supra note 5, at 23-29.
89 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
90 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Bryant, supra note 5, at 15.
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opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law" or "if
the state court confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from 91
a
relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a result opposite to ours."
By narrowly defining "contrary to" as "opposite," rather than construing it
more broadly to "include a finding that the state-court 'decision' is simply
'erroneous' or wrong,, 92 Justice O'Connor once again appeared-without
explicitly doing so-to restrict the circumstances under which federal
courts should grant habeas relief in appeals from state court judgments.
Justice O'Connor's discussion of the "unreasonable application" clause is
similarly delphic: a state court's application of federal law is
"unreasonable" if it 1) "unreasonably applies" the Supreme Court's
governing rule to the facts presented, or 2) "either unreasonably extends a
legal principle from our precedent to a new context where it should not
apply or unreasonably 93refuses to extend that principle to a new context
where it should apply.,
The Court was even less clear in defining what constituted "clearly
established" federal law. On the one hand, Justice O'Connor noted that
"whatever would qualify as an old rule under our Teague jurisprudence will
constitute 'clearly established Federal law,' ' 94 thus implicitly
acknowledging that AEDPA might have enlarged the class of rules
retroactively applicable in habeas proceedings. 95 However, Justice
O'Connor's decision that AEDPA did not narrow the class of "old rules"
left unexplained how AEDPA affected the "new rules" category; did it
remain the same as under Teague, or did AEDPA narrow that category,
consequently expanding the "old rules" category? 96 The only clear message
was that AEDPA did not entirely supersede Teague; despite their seeming
contradictions, the two continued to govern federal habeas law.
B. SIXTH AMENDMENT IN SENTENCING
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees "a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury" in "all criminal prosecutions. 9 7
91 Williams, 529 U.S. at 405 (O'Connor, J.). Although Justice Stevens wrote for the
Court for most of Williams, Justice O'Connor wrote for the Court with respect to the
portions of her opinion quoted here. This is particularly confusing given Justice Stevens's
dissatisfaction with this interpretation of "contrary to." See infra note 96 and accompanying
text.
92 Id. at 389 (Stevens, J.).
93 Id. at 407 (O'Connor, J.).
94 Id. at 412 (O'Connor, J.).
95 Bryant, supranote 5, at 18.
96 Id. at 19.
97 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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Nowhere, however, does the Constitution specifically address the role of
juries in criminal proceedings. The Schriro decision presented a Sixth
Amendment question because, pursuant to the Arizona law under which
Summerlin was convicted and sentenced, a judge alone found the
aggravating
factors necessary to the imposition of Summerlin's death
98
sentence.
For most of the nation's history, the Sixth Amendment applied only to
trials in federal courts, but in 1968, the Supreme Court ruled that the
Amendment's jury trial guarantee was incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment's promise of due process in state legal proceedings. 99 The
exact contours of the jury guarantee, though, remained unclear. In 1990,
the Court seemed to hold that it did not extend to the sentencing context,
upholding the Arizona capital sentencing scheme under which Summerlin
was originally sentenced to death.' 00 Justice White, writing for the majority
in Walton v. Arizona, observed that the Court had rejected numerous
constitutional challenges to Florida's capital punishment scheme, which
resembled Arizona's in its grant of sentencing authority to judges.10 1 In
such cases, Justice White noted, the Court had held that the Sixth
Amendment does not command that a jury find those specific facts that
permit the imposition of capital punishment.' 0 2 Justice Stevens responded
with a vigorous dissent, quoting extensively from White's own dissent in
Duncan v. Louisiana,10 3 and drawing heavily on historical sources. Stevens
declared, "in 1791, when the Sixth Amendment became law... 'the jury's
role in findingfacts that would determine a homicide defendant's eligibility
for capital punishment was particularly well established.', 10 4 Although
various members of the Court dissented from other parts of Justice White's
majority opinion, Justice Stevens was alone in his view that the Sixth
Amendment commanded jury fact-finding in sentencing.
Nevertheless, just twelve years later, the Court struck down the
sentencing scheme it had upheld in Walton. 10 5 The key change during the
intervening period was the Court's landmark decision in Apprendi v. New

98

Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2521 (2004).

99 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
100 Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
101Id. at 647.
102Id. at 648 (citing Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638, 640-41 (1989)).
103Id. at 711-13 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Duncan, 391 U.S. 145.
104 Walton, 497 U.S. at 710-11 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Welsh S. White, FactFinding and the Death Penalty: The Scope of a CapitalDefendant's Right to Jury Trial, 65
NOTRE DAME L.REv. 1, 10-11 (1989)).
105 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
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Jersey.106 In Apprendi, the Court established that the Sixth Amendment
requires a jury to find any fact that expands the range of available
sentences. 10 7 According to Justice Stevens, Apprendi's holding that the
Sixth Amendment guaranteed defendants a right to have a jury find a
sentence-enhancing aggravating factor was "foreshadowed" 10 8 by the
Court's decision, one year earlier, in Jones v. United States.'0 9 There, the
Court had held that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require that "any fact
(other than a prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a
crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven
beyond a reasonable doubt." 110 But Jones was far from the only
precedential support for Apprendi; Justice Stevens's opinion also included a
lengthy discussion of the history of the jury requirement in sentencing.",
This passage ends with Justice Stevens remarking on "the novelty of a
legislative scheme that removes the jury from the determination of a fact
that, if found, exposes the criminal defendant to a penalty exceeding the
maximum he would receive
if punished according to the facts reflected in
' 12
the jury verdict alone."'
Apprendi concluded by distinguishing between sentencing "factors"
and "elements" of a crime.1 13 According to Apprendi, "factors" do not
enhance sentences beyond a statutorily specified range, and therefore may
be found by a judge, whereas "elements" are necessary to the expansion of
the range of available sentences and must be found by a jury.' 14 Apprendi
states that whether a given fact constitutes an element of a crime or a
sentencing factor is a question "not of form, but of effect---does the
required finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment than that
authorized by the jury's verdict?"'1 15 If so, then that finding is an element,
regardless of the label attached to it under a given statutory scheme. Justice
Kennedy reiterated this formulation two years later in Harris v. United
States, holding, "those facts setting the outer limits of a sentence, and of the

106 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
107

Stevens authored the majority opinion in Apprendi, thus effectively validating his

Walton dissent. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
...Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476.
109 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
...Id. at 243, n.6.
"l Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 474-82.
112
13
114

Id. at 482-83.
Id. at 494.
Id.

115 Id.
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judicial power to impose it, are the elements of the crime for the purposes
of the constitutional analysis."" 6
On the same day it decided Harris, the Court announced in Ring v.
Arizona that the Sixth Amendment requires that a jury find all facts
necessary to the imposition of a death sentence. 1 7 In so doing, the Court
explicitly overruled Walton "to the extent that it allows a sentencing judge,
sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for
imposition of the death penalty." ' 1 8 Apprendi had evaded the question
posed by Walton, stating that it stood for the proposition that the Sixth
Amendment did not invalidate "state capital sentencing schemes requiring
judges, after a jury verdict holding a defendant guilty of a capital crime, to
find specific aggravating factors before imposing a sentence of death." 119
But this construction of the Arizona scheme was not strictly accurate, for
under it a crime did not become a capital offense until the judge found the
aggravating factors. The Ring Court recognized that Walton could not be
reconciled with its recent Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. 20 Thus, since
"Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors operate as 'the functional
equivalent of a greater offense,"",121 the Court invalidated the scheme under
which Summerlin was convicted and sentenced to death.
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1982, an Arizona jury convicted Warren Summerlin of first-degree
murder and sexual assault. 122 Shortly thereafter, the court held an informal,
123
non-adversarial hearing without a jury to decide Summerlin's sentence.
At the close of the proceeding, the judge found the presence of two
aggravating
factors and no mitigating factors and sentenced Summerlin to
24
death. 1

116536 U.S. 545, 567 (2002). This portion of Justice Kennedy's opinion was joined only

by a plurality of the Court.
117536 U.S. 584 (2002).
1" Id. at 609.
"9 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498.
120

Ring, 536 U.S. at 609.

121Id. (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 n.19).
123

Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 2003).
Id.at 1089.

124

id.

122
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A. SUMMERLIN'S PERSONAL HISTORY
As the Ninth Circuit remarked, the narrative of Summerlin's case was
"the raw material from which legal fiction is forged. 1 25 Summerlin's
childhood was certainly' the stuff of melodrama: his father was a convicted
armed robber killed in a shootout, his mother an alcoholic who physically
126
abused Summerlin and subjected him to electroshock therapy.
Summerlin suffered from dyslexia and failed to complete the seventh grade,
and as a teenager he committed a number
of petty crimes; he was later
127
schizophrenic.
paranoid
a
as
diagnosed
Prior to the murder at issue, however, Summerlin committed only one
serious adult felony: he brandished a knife at the driver of a car that struck
his wife, and was later convicted of aggravated assault. 128 Although this
conviction occurred after Summerlin's murder trial had begun, the judge in
the murder case cited it as a factor that contributed to his death sentence. 129
B. THE MURDER
On April 29, 1981, an account investigator named Brenna Bailey
visited Summerlin's home in order to speak with his wife about an overdue
account.1 30 Bailey never returned to her office, and her boyfriend reported
her missing that evening. 31 That same night, an anonymous caller-later
identified as Summerlin's mother-in-law-informed a hotline that
Summerlin had murdered Bailey and wrapped her in a carpet; at trial she
testified that she had obtained this information from her daughter
132
(Summerlin's wife), who had learned it through extra-sensory perception.
The next day, police discovered Bailey's partially nude body wrapped in a
133
bloody bedsheet in the trunk of Summerlin's car, her skull crushed.
When officers arrived to search Summerlin's house, he stated, "I didn't kill
anybody," then inquired whether they were looking for "the girl that was at
my house"; asked whom he meant, Summerlin described Bailey. 34 After

125

Id. at 1084.

126

Id.

127

id.

Id.
Id.
130 Id.
131 id.
132 Id.at 1084-85.
131Id.at 1085.
128
129

134id
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his wife identified
the bed-sheet as theirs, the police arrested Summerlin for
135
Bailey's murder.
C. TRIAL, SENTENCING, AND DIRECT APPEAL

Summerlin's arrest set in motion a byzantine sequence of pre-trial
proceedings. The court appointed the public defender's office to represent
Summerlin, but shortly after the appointment his counsel left the public
defender's office and was replaced by another attorney whom the Ninth
Circuit identified as "Roe.' 36 Summerlin underwent a series of psychiatric
and psychological examinations, which revealed him to be "functionally
mentally retarded" and also found "indications of organic brain impairment,
border-line personality disorder, and paranoid personality disorder."
Nevertheless, under Arizona law, Summerlin was legally sane and fit to
stand trial. 137 That the trial occurred at all was thus due in large part to the
fact that, at the time, Arizona applied
the "M'Naghten test" for determining
138
mental competency to stand trial.
Roe then entered into plea negations, obtaining an agreement that the
Ninth Circuit later characterized as "extremely favorable."' 139 Under its
terms, Summerlin would plead guilty, without actually admitting his guilt,
to second-degree murder, and receive a sentence of twenty-one years in
prison, of which he was required to serve at least fourteen. 140 Summerlin
would also plead guilty to aggravated assault based on his confrontation
with the driver who had hit his wife, and admit that he had violated the
terms of a probation arising from an earlier burglary. 141 This second plea
would carry a maximum fifteen-year prison term, to run concurrently with
his murder sentence. 142 However, the possibility remained that the court
might reject the agreement after Summerlin entered the agreed-upon pleas,
in which case Sunmerlin could either withdraw his pleas and stand trial, or
allow the pleas to stand and face a possible sentence of up to thirty-eight135Id.
136

id.

"' Id.at 1085-86.
138Id.at 1085. Under the M'Naghten test,
an accused is not criminally responsible if, at the time of committing the act, he was laboring
under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind as not to know the nature and quality of
the act he was doing, or if he did know it that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 694 (6th ed. 1991).
139 Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1086.
140Id. This intricate procedure is known as an "Alford' plea. Id.; see North Carolina v.
Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
141Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1086.
142 Id.
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and-a-half years in prison. 143 Summerlin initially entered his pleas as
arranged, but he then reversed course and, acting pro se, asked the court to
withdraw his pleas and replace Roe with new counsel. 144 The judge denied
the motions and informed Summerlin that he planned to reject the plea
agreement. 145 On December 18, 1981, Roe attempted unsuccessfully to
transfer the case to a new court, citing the judge's rejection of the plea
agreement as evidence of bias. 146
From this point on, the proceedings were fraught with irregularities.
On the same night that Roe sought to challenge the court's impartiality, she
commenced a romantic relationship with the prosecuting attorney, but she
continued to represent Summerlin even after he withdrew from the plea
agreement and decided to go to trial.' 47 Several days later, after Summerlin
once again requested new counsel, Roe withdrew from the case without
informing Summerlin about her romantic conflict of interest, and the court
appointed a private practitioner named George Klink to represent
Summerlin.' 48 In response to the romantic conflict of interest, the Arizona
Attorney General assumed control of the case and promptly announced that
any lesser plea agreement-such as the one Roe had negotiated-was
unacceptable. 49 In addition, a new judge was assigned to conduct the
murder trial.' 50 Judge Marquardt, however, brought with him problems of
his own: throughout Summerlin's trial and sentencing, Marquardt was a
habitual user of marijuana, a fact later cited to explain some problematic
behavior on his part.' 51 In fact, Marquardt's drug
problem was sufficiently
15 2
serious to result, ultimately, in his disbarment.
Meanwhile, Klink was providing Summerlin with substandard
representation. Klink first tried to disqualify the judge (not Judge
143

Id.

144 Id.
145 id
146

Id.

147

Id. at 1086-87.

148

Id. at 1088.

149

Id.

150 Id.
151 Id. at 1089.

For example, on the same day that Judge Marquardt sentenced

Summerlin to death, he also imposed a death sentence on another capital defendant, James
Clifford Fisher. But a court later overturned Fisher's sentence because it resulted, in part,
from a plea agreement into which Judge Marquardt improperly entered as a party, and which
Judge Marquardt allowed into evidence at Fisher's trial. Moreover, Summerlin later alleged
that Judge Marquardt confused the facts of his case with those of Fisher's case, blaming this
confusion on Judge Marquardt's drug-addled state. Id. at 1090-91.
152 Judge Marquardt was sanctioned and then disbarred following a drug deal that went
awry. Id. at 1089-90.
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Marquardt) hearing Summerlin's assault trial, and when that failed, Klink
sought a continuance because he was unprepared. 153 The court denied this
motion, and the case went to trial, where Klink called only one witnessSummerlin's wife-and failed to obtain any psychiatric evaluations of
Summerlin, whom the court convicted of aggravated assault. 154 Klink's
defense of Summerlin during the subsequent murder trial was similarly
slipshod. Once again, Mrs. Sunmerlin was the sole witness called on her
husband's behalf.'
Furthermore, although Klink's theory was that
Summerlin lacked premeditation in committing the murder, Klink offered
no evidentiary support for the theory; in fact, he neglected to present any
psychiatric evidence at all.156 After a four-day trial and less than four hours
of deliberation,
the jury convicted Summerlin of first-degree murder and
1 57
sexual assault.
During the month between Summerlin's conviction and his sentencing
hearing, Klink never once met with Summerlin, and he also neglected to
contact either of the psychiatrists who had initially examined Summerlin,
although the State planned to call both as witnesses. 1" 8 Klink's one planned
witness was a doctor who would testify about emotional and physical abuse
that Summerlin may have suffered as a child, but Klink prepared no
evidence supporting the testimony. 159 At the hearing, Sunmerlin objected
to Klink's decision to call the doctor, so
no witnesses testified in support of
0
hearing.16
sentencing
the
at
Summerlin
Following a period marked by Judge Marquardt's erratic behavior, the
penalty phase began.161 The proceedings were again irregular, but the result
was clear: after finding two aggravating circumstances-Summerlin's
felony conviction (for aggravated assault), and Summerlin's having
murdered Bailey "in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner"and no mitigating circumstances, Judge Marquardt sentenced Summerlin to

153 Id. at 1088.
154

Id. Judge Marquardt cited this conviction as one aggravating factor leading to

Summerlin's death sentence. See infra note 162 and accompanying text.
"s Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1088.
156 Id. This oversight was a particularly damning error in Summerlin's case, as his
previously diagnosed psychiatric problems might have cast serious doubt on his capacity for
premeditation.
157

id.

' Id. at 1088-89.
159
160

Id.
Id.
161 Id. at 1090.
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death. 162 On appeal, the
Arizona Supreme Court upheld Summerlin's
163
conviction and sentence.
D. HABEAS PETITIONS
Over the ensuing years, Summerlin repeatedly sought collateral review
of his conviction and sentence, filing two federal and four state petitions for
habeas corpus. 164 In 1997, after the denial of his second federal petition,
Summerlin filed a motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 59(e). 165 The federal district court denied this motion;
however, the court authorized Summerlin to appeal its denial. 66 A threejudge panel from the Ninth Circuit partly affirmed and partly reversed the
district court, then remanded the matter for an evidentiary hearing
into
167
sentencing.
Summerlin's
during
competence
Marquardt's
Judge
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Ring v. Arizona,
which presented Sixth Amendment questions about Arizona's death penalty
statute.16 Because Summerlin had raised related issues in his habeas
petitions, the Ninth Circuit deferred any evidentiary hearing pending the
Supreme Court's decision in Ring.169 After the Supreme Court invalidated
Arizona's sentencing scheme in Ring,170 Summerlin requested that the panel
stay its proceedings so that he could petition the Arizona Supreme Court for
the opportunity to re-try his appeal under the new Ring regime. 171 The
his petition. 172
circuit court entered the stay, but the Arizona court denied
173
The Ninth Circuit then heard Summerlin's case en banc.
E. NINTH CIRCUIT
Before the Ninth Circuit, Summerlin contested the constitutionality of
both his conviction and his sentence. With respect to the guilt phase of his
trial, Summerlin argued that he had received ineffective assistance of

162 Id. at 1091 (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703(F)(6) (2003)).
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id.; FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e).
166 Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1091.
167

Id.

168 534 U.S. 1103 (2002).
169

Id.

170 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002); see supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
171Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1091.
172 Id. at 1091-92.
173 Id. at 1092.
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counsel. 174 Sunmerlin also presented multiple arguments challenging the
constitutionality of the penalty phase of his trial, but the court addressed
only Summerlin's claim that the sentencing procedure infringed on his
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. 175 Sunmerlin argued that because
the Supreme Court had ruled, in Ring, that Arizona's sentencing scheme
violated the Sixth Amendment by allowing a judge to find facts necessary
to the imposition of the death penalty, his death sentence was
constitutionally invalid.1 76 Although the court found that Summerlin had
not demonstrated ineffective assistance, it agreed, in a lengthy and
extremely thorough opinion, with Summerlin's claim that Ring should
apply retroactively
in the habeas context, thus overturning Summerlin's
177
death sentence.
Applying Teague, the Ninth Circuit first determined that Ring's rule
was substantive, thus meeting Teague's first prong for retroactivity. 78
After a detailed discussion of the history of capital punishment in Arizona,
the majority concluded, "when Ring displaced Walton, the effect was to
declare Arizona's understanding and treatment of the separate crime of
capital murder, as Arizona defined it, unconstitutional.'' 179 In support of the
idea that the availability of capital punishment brings about a substantive,
categorical transformation of the crimes charged, the majority cited the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, where
Justice Scalia held that 'murder plus one or more aggravating
circumstances' is a separate offense from 'murder' simpliciter."'18 The
Ninth Circuit analogized Ring to Sattazahn, asserting that "Ring
reintroduced 'capital murder' as a separate substantive offense under
Arizona law, redefining, in the process, what the substantive elements of
this 'separate offense' of capital murder are." 18 1 The court then considered,
and quickly rejected, Summerlin's claim that Ring did not announce a new
rule for Teague purposes. 82 The majority cited the principle, established in
Butler, that habeas courts should evaluate the "reasonableness" of state
court decisions in light of Supreme Court precedent. 83 Because the court
174

Id.

175

Id. at 1092,1121.

176

Id. at 1092.

177Id. at
178Id. at

1121.

1101.

Id. at 1105.
180 Id. (quoting Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 111 (2003)).
181Id.at 1106.
179

182

Id. at 1109.

183

Id. (citing Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 414 (1990)); see supra note 78 and

accompanying text.
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did not believe that a state court in 1984 "would have acted objectively
new.184
unreasonably" in Summerlin, the majority held that Ring's rule was
Next, the Ninth Circuit addressed the question of whether Ring
qualified for retroactive application under prong two of Teague as well as
prong one.1 85 With respect to the accuracy element of this second prong,
the majority observed that the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment
precedent imposed higher standards of accuracy on courts in the capital
sentencing context,18 6 stating that in Summerlin's case, given Judge
Marquardt's behavior, concerns about judicial accuracy in fact-finding were
"not merely theoretical., 187 Further, accuracy in sentencing was not simply
a factual matter but also a moral one:
entrusting a jury with the authority to impose a capital verdict is an important
procedural safeguard, because the jury members "are more attuned to the
community's moral sensibility," "reflect more accurately the composition and
experiences of the community as a whole," and act 1to8 8"express the conscience of the
community on the ultimate question of life or death.,

Moral judgment was especially salient in Summerlin's case, as his
sentence was based in part on a finding that he had acted "in an especially
heinous, cruel or depraved manner.' 89 The court concluded that Ring "will
significantly improve the accuracy of capital trials in Arizona." 190
The court then held that Ring also satisfied the second element of
Teague's procedural exception to nonretroactivity, because it "established
the bedrock principle that, under the Sixth Amendment, a jury verdict is
required on the finding of aggravated circumstances necessary to the
imposition of the death penalty."' 191 The majority asserted that Arizona's
jury-free sentencing procedure constituted structural error because it
impaired the efficacy of a trial's fact-finding function and cast ineradicable
doubt on sentencing fairness.192 After a discussion of recent Supreme Court
precedent demonstrating the necessity of jury fact-finding, 93 the court
noted that in the capital sentencing context, the Eighth Amendment added
Id. (quoting O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 156 (1997)).
Id. at 1109-21; see supra Part II.A.4.b.
186 Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1110-15.
187 Id. at 1115.
188Id. at 1113-14 (quoting Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 615-16 (2002) (Breyer, J.,
184

185

concurring)).
189 Id. at 1091 (quoting ARIz. REv. STAT.

§ 13-703(F)(6) (2003)); see supra text

accompanying note 162.
190 Id. at 1115.
191 Id. at 1116.
192 Id. (citing Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78 (1986)).
'9' Id. at 1116-18.
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special weight to the Sixth Amendment's commands. 194

Finally, the

majority addressed Teague's requirement that a procedural rule must be
"truly watershed" in nature in order to be retroactively applicable,
concluding that insofar as Ring's holding was procedural, it "define[d]
structural safeguards implicit in our concept of ordered liberty that are
murder trials," thus
necessary to protect the fundamental fairness of capital
1 95
satisfying the remainder of Teague's second prong.
The court upheld Summerlin's conviction but overturned his death
sentence on the grounds that Ring was retroactively applicable, thus
invalidating Summerlin's sentence.1 96 Arizona appealed Ring's retroactive
application, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 97 The sole issue
before the
Court was whether Ring should apply retroactively in the habeas
198
context.

IV. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
A. MAJORITY
Justice Scalia wrote for the majority in Schriro.199 Justice Scalia's
opinion is notable for its brevity: the printed slip opinion covers a mere ten
pages. 200 Moreover, Justice Scalia devoted nearly half of this space to the
factual and procedural history of the case and a recitation of the basic law
on habeas retroactivity. 0 1 Justice Scalia's terseness presents a particularly
remarkable contrast to the Ninth Circuit opinion under review.2 °2 Before
proceeding to his consideration of the Ninth Circuit's opinion, Justice

'
195

Id. at 1118-19.
Id. at 1121.

196

Id. In so doing, the Ninth Circuit created a circuit split, as two circuits had already

classified Ring as purely procedural and declined to apply it retroactively. See Turner v.
Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2003); Cannon v. Mullin, 297 F.3d 989 (10th Cir. 2002).
'9' 124 S. Ct. 833 (2003).

198 Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519,2521 (2004).
199 Justice Scalia's majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Kennedy, O'Connor, and Thomas.
200 Schriro v. Summerlin, No. 03-526, slip. op. at 1-10 (S. Ct. June 24, 2004). By
contrast, the twenty-seven other majority and plurality opinions issued by the Court in June
2004 average eighteen pages in length.
20 Schriro, 124 S. Ct. at 2521-23.
202 Judge Thomas's decision for the Ninth Circuit covers sixty-nine pages, forty-eight of
which are given over to legal analysis of the Teague issues on which the Supreme Court
granted certiorari. Sunmerlin v. Stewart, No. 98-99002, slip. op. 12707, 12712-81 (9th Cir.
Sept. 2, 2003).
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Scalia noted, without further comment, that the
circuit court had "agreed
20 3
with the State that Ring announced a new rule.,
In addressing the Ninth Circuit's holding that Ring's rule effected a
substantive change in Arizona law, Justice Scalia first emphasized
precedent that, in his view, demonstrated that "[a] rule is substantive rather
than procedural if it alters the range of conduct or the class of persons that
the law punishes. 20 4 On the other hand, "rules that regulate only the
20 5
manner of determining the defendant's culpability are procedural.
Seizing upon this distinction, Justice Scalia distinguished Summerlin's
actual case, as he saw it, from Summerlin's argument: "This Court's
holding that, because Arizona has made a certain fact essential to the death
penalty, that fact must be found by a jury, is not the same as this Court's
making a certain fact essential to the death penalty., 20 6 According to
Justice Scalia, the former would be a procedural holding, and the latter a
substantive one.
Responding to the idea that Ring qualified for the procedural rule
exception to Teague's nonretroactivity presumption, Justice Scalia disputed
the Ninth Circuit's assertion that Ring's jury guarantee significantly
enhanced fact-finding accuracy.20 7 He argued that "[t]he evidence is simply
too equivocal to support that conclusion," since "for every argument why
juries are more accurate fact-finders, there is another why they are less
accurate., 208 After citing several scholarly and judicial sources, Justice
Scalia concluded, "[w]hen so many presumably reasonable minds continue
to disagree over whether juries are better fact-finders at all, we cannot
confidently say that judicial fact-finding seriously diminishes accuracy. 20 9
Justice Scalia also disputed the relevance of "moral accuracy," observing,
"the statute here does not condition death eligibility on whether the offense
2 10
is heinous, cruel, or depraved as determined by community standards.,
Similarly, he called the "death is different" argument against applying
Teague in capital cases "not an application of Teague, but a rejection of
it." 2 11 As precedential support for his stance that Ring does not qualify for

203

Schriro, 124 S. Ct. at 2523.

204

Id.
Id. (citing Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998)).

205

210

Id. at 2524.
Id. at 2525.
Id.
id.
Id. at 2526.

211

id.

206
207
208
209
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retroactive effect, Justice Scalia relied largely on DeStefano v. Woods.212
There, the Court declined to retroactively apply its ruling in Duncan v.
Louisiana extending the jury trial guarantee to the states because such
213
application failed the three-factor Stovall test.
Justice Scalia closed with a policy-based argument dominated by
finality and federalism:
[Though t]he right to jury trial is fundamental to our system of criminal procedure...
it does not follow that, when a criminal defendant has had a full trial and one round of
appeals in which the State faithfully applied the Constitution as we understood it at
the time, he may nevertheless continue2 to
14 litigate his claims indefinitely in hopes that
we will one day have a change of heart.
The Court thus overturned the Ninth Circuit's retroactive application
of Ring and reinstated Summerlin's death sentence.215
B. DISSENT
Justice Breyer dissented from the Schriro majority opinion.216 He
started by emphasizing the importance of juries' moral accuracy, but
conceded that when he had adopted this perspective in his Ring
concurrence, he did so alone.217 Justice Breyer then enumerated three
218
arguments against the Schriro majority's result.
First, he recast his "moral accuracy" argument in terms of
"community-based value judgments., 2 19 Justice Breyer observed that three
of the four states that would be affected by the retroactive application of
Ring applied a sentencing aggravator like the one at issue in Schriro,
requiring fact-finders to determine whether a defendant acted in a "heinous,
cruel, or depraved manner." 220 He then stated that such terms "require
reference to community-based standards," which juries are clearly "better
equipped" than judges to define and apply.2 2'
Next, Justice Breyer argued that the primary aim behind Justice
Harlan's pre-Teague opinions was to ensure that the Court "balance

212 392 U.S. 631 (1968) (per curiam); Schriro, 124 S. Ct. at 2525-26.
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221

DeStefano, 392 U.S. at 633-35 (per curiam).
Schriro, 124 S.Ct. at 2526.
Id.
Justice Breyer's dissent was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens.
Id. at 2527 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id.at 2528-31 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id.at 2528 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id.(Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting ARIz. REv. STAT. § 13-703(F)(6) (2003)).
Id.(Breyer, J., dissenting).
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competing considerations. ' 222 On the one hand, the "basic objectives" of
the writ of habeas corpus favored granting Ring retroactive effect, as did the
criminal justice system's general focus on justice and equity.223 On the
other hand, Justice Breyer acknowledged Teague's emphasis on federalism,
finality, and the limited resources available in the criminal justice system. 224
As Justice Breyer noted, however, Ring's retroactive application would
affect only 110 prisoners nationally, and in the capital sentencing context,
finality concerns weigh on the side of the defendant, not of the courts. 225
Third, Justice Breyer disputed the relevance of DeStefano v. Woods, on
which Justice Scalia relied.226 He noted that DeStefano predated Teague,
which cast doubt on its authority.227 Justice Breyer then concluded by
arguing that even on its own terms, DeStefano did not bar the retroactive
application of Ring, because two of the three factors cited in DeStefano
were consequentialist in nature and expressed the Court's reluctance to
substantially disrupt state criminal justice systems.22 8 But because Ring's
retroactive application would have extremely limited effects, Justice Breyer
229
asserted that neither factor applied in Schriro.
V. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court was wrong to overrule the Ninth Circuit's decision
to apply Ring retroactively. The Court should have acknowledged the
watershed nature of Ring, vacated Summerlin's death sentence, and
remanded this case for sentencing in accordance with Ring. The flaws in
Justice Scalia's opinion stem from a variety of sources, chief among them
his misinterpretation of Supreme Court precedent and his fixation on extraconstitutional policy preferences like finality and comity.23 °
222

Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).

223 Id. at 2528-29 (Breyer, J., dissenting). According to Breyer, these "basic
objectives"

of habeas corpus are "protecting the innocent against erroneous conviction or punishment
and assuring fundamentally fair procedures." Id. at 2528 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
224 Id. at 2529-30 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
225 Id. at 2530 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
226 Id. at 2530-31; see supraPart IV.A.
221 Schriro, 124 S. Ct. at 2530 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
228 Id. at 2530-31 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Specifically, Breyer cited DeStefano's
emphasis on "the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application" and "the
extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards." Id. at 2530
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 633 (1968) (per
curiam)).
229 124 S. Ct. at 2531 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
230 Finality and comity are not expressly mentioned
in the Constitution. Of course,
comity may be implied in the Constitution's federalist structure, and John Hart Ely argued
that the Fifth Amendment's prohibition of double jeopardy, among other purposes,
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A central weakness of Justice Scalia's opinion is its reliance on
Teague. First, even within the Teague retroactivity framework, Schriro
reaches the wrong result in overturning the Ninth Circuit's retroactive
application of Ring. Justice Scalia's use of Teague is particularly
distressing because AEDPA continues to provide the Court with the
opportunity to revisit-and elucidate-its retroactivity framework by
expressly reconciling Teague and AEDPA. Unfortunately, Justice Scalia
has apparently declined the invitation. Although, in Schriro, Justice Scalia
purported to uphold existing retroactivity law, that law itself is an
incoherent jumble of statute, precedent, and policy; there is virtually
nothing to uphold. But rather than effecting a much-needed clarification of
habeas retroactivity law, Justice Scalia instead took advantage of its
indeterminacy by espousing a regime that furthered his own extraconstitutional policy goals. That these goals trumped constitutional theory
is evident in Schriro's abandonment of Justice Scalia's "originalist"
approach. Unfortunately (and paradoxically), despite the activist, goaloriented approach that underlies the Schriro decision, that holding's
consequences are likely to be deleterious from the perspectives of both
jurisprudential logic and public policy.
A. DOES TEAGUE GOVERN?

The first question that Schriro raises is whether Justice Scalia
employed the proper analytical framework in deciding the case. Put another
way, was Teague's retroactivity regime the appropriate lens through which
Summerlin's claims should have been viewed? For two basic reasons, the
answer to this question must be "no." First, because Schriro involved
capital punishment, Justice Scalia should have paid greater attention to
Eighth Amendment concerns. A proper consideration of the Eighth
Amendment would have led to a different result in Schriro. In addition,
since the passage of AEDPA in 1996, the Court has yet to fully confront the
ways in which Congress modified Teague retroactivity. Schriro presented
the Court with a perfect opportunity to resolve the ambiguities created by
AEDPA, which, at least in part, superseded Teague's retroactivity
framework.

"guarantee[s ] a sense of repose, an assurance that at some definable point the defendant can
assume the ordeal is over." JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW 96 (1980). But regardless of the credibility of these theories, their nonexplicit nature would seem to render them strange bases on which Justice Scalia, the archtextualist, would rest an opinion. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
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1. Is Death Different?
In Penry v. Lynaugh, the Court extended the applicability of Teague's
" ' But Penry and its
retroactivity rules to the capital sentencing context.23
232
progeny are fatally flawed insofar as they fail to reconcile the law of
habeas corpus with the commands of the Eighth Amendment, instead
simply extending Teague's nonretroactivity presumption to the capital
punishment context despite the constitutionally recognized uniqueness of
the death penalty. Unfortunately, Schriro perpetuated this mistake. 233 A
long line of Supreme Court precedent demonstrates that because "the death
penalty is qualitatively different from any other punishment," deathsentencing procedures must meet a much higher bar of fairness and
accuracy in order to be constitutionally valid.234 Summerlin emphasized
this history in his discussion of his case's Eighth Amendment
ramifications.23 5 In fact, Summerlin's Eighth Amendment argument
receives ample support both from the Court's own precedent and from
scholarship investigating the death penalty from legal and non-legal
perspectives.236
Nevertheless, in Schriro, Justice Scalia called the "death is different"
idea "not an application of Teague, but a rejection of it, in favor of a
broader endeavor to 'balance competing considerations.' 237 Of course, this
statement correctly describes Summerlin's (and Justice Breyer's)
38 It also, if followed to its logical conclusion, should lead to a reposition. 238
evaluation of either Teague's application to the capital sentencing context,
or the "death is different" idea itself. Either way, Schriro would have
entailed a major transformation of the Court's governing law, whether in
231 492 U.S. 302 (1989); see supra Part II.A.5.

II.A.5.
Schriro thus continued the Rehnquist Court's tendency to treat capital punishment

232 See supra Part
233

more like other punishments than previous courts have done by stressing the importance of
efficiency and removing procedural safeguards that reflected the Court's view of the death
penalty's singular nature. See Kenneth Williams, The Deregulationof the Death Penalty, 40
SANTA CLARA L. REv. 677 (2000). But see Carol S. Steiker, Things Fall Apart, But the
Center Holds: The Supreme Court and the Death Penalty, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1475, 1484
(2002) ("The Court's decisions in Atkins and Ring do not merely reflect [the] trend in public
attitudes toward skepticism about the administration of capital punishment; to some degree,
of course, the Court's decisions reinforce this skepticism.").
234Metzner, supranote 7, at 160 (quoting Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 468 (1984)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
235 Brief for Respondent at 37-38, Schriro (No. 03-0526).
236 See THE DEATH PENALTY, supranote 6.
237 Schriro, 124 S. Ct. at 2526 (quoting Schriro, 124 S. Ct. at 2528 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting)).
238 See supra notes 222-25 and accompanying text.
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the Eighth Amendment or habeas retroactivity field, for as Justice Scalia
apparently recognized, Teague (and especially Penry) and "death is
different" are fundamentally in tension with one another. Instead, Justice
Scalia simply described the conflict and then proceeded to apply Teague, as
if merely to depict a legal problem were to resolve it. Although such a
cursory approach may be appropriate to Teague, it is worthy of neither
Justice Scalia nor "death is different," which boasts a judicial heritage of
great distinction.23 9
Only by waving away the Eighth Amendment issues that Summerlin's
case presented could Justice Scalia collapse Ring's death-specific rule into
Apprendi's broader one, rendering the two indistinguishable for Teague
purposes. This faulty equation of the two then allowed Justice Scalia to
deny the watershed nature of Ring, and also to reject the Ninth Circuit's
argument that the availability of capital punishment rendered Ring's rule
substantive. 240 Justice Scalia thus either misread or ignored-or perhaps
both-the Court's Eighth Amendment decisions regarding the uniquely
high accuracy requirements present in capital cases. Had he not made this
fundamental mistake, Justice Scalia would have recognized that Ring's rule
expresses a "bedrock" principle of American criminal justice.
2. Did AEDPA Narrow Teague?
As noted earlier, the Court has yet to satisfactorily resolve how
AEDPA affected the application of Teague.24 1 Although, in Williams v.
Taylor and subsequent cases, the Court attempted to incorporate Teague's
conception of habeas retroactivity into AEDPA, it did not address the key
question: how exactly did AEDPA redefine what constitutes a "new rule"
for retroactivity purposes?24 2 Several scholars have observed that the plain
language of AEDPA seems to define the "new rule" category in a more
limited fashion than the Teague line of cases has done.243 Specifically,
these writers point to the text of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which codified the
relevant portion of AEDPA. This provision authorizes courts to grant the
239

See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501

U.S. 957, 994 (1991) ("Proportionality review is one of several respects in which we have
held that 'death is different,' and have imposed protections that the Constitution nowhere
else provides."); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) ("[T]he penalty of
death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment ....");Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) ("[D]eath as a punishment is unique in its severity and
irrevocability").
240 See infra Part V.B.1.
241 See supra text accompanying notes 89-96.
242 Bryant, supra note 5, at 41.
243 See,e.g.,
id.
at 41-44; Yackle, supranote 82, at 414-21.
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writ where the challenged proceedings "resulted in a decision that was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 2 "
A strict reading of this language suggests that Congress intended to narrow
the field of circumstances under which Teague's retroactivity bar would
apply, for it requires courts to grant the writ even where the proceedings at
issue were simply "unreasonable." This formulation borrows Butler's
presumption that the writ should not overturn "reasonable" state court
decisions, but it does not take up Chief Justice Rehnquist's corollary, which
precluded reviewing courts from determining a challenged verdict's
"reasonableness" in light of later decisions.245
Curiously, though, Justice Scalia's Schriro opinion does not mention
either AEDPA or the federal habeas statute in which it was codified.24 6
This omission would be bizarre coming from any member of the Court.
But it is particularly noteworthy that Justice Scalia would adopt such a
precedent-based common law perspective on retroactivity, because he has
written extensively on the inappropriateness of this analytical model for
constitutional adjudication.247
B. MISREADING TEAGUE

Even if the Schriro majority was correct in choosing to apply the
Teague retroactivity test to Summerlin's Ring-based petition without
considering the, impact of AEDPA, it reached the wrong result because it
misapplied Teague and its progeny.
1. Ring as "Substantive" Rule
In classifying Ring's rule as procedural, Justice Scalia effectively
evaded the Court's precedent regarding the element/factor distinction. This
omission was essential to Justice Scalia's result, because if he had conceded
that Ring redefined the Arizona scheme's "aggravating factors" as
"elements," then he would have been compelled to agree with the Ninth
Circuit's decision that Ring was substantive. According to Justice Scalia,
Ring established that, "because Arizona's statutory aggravating factors
restricted... the class of death-eligible defendants, those aggravators
effectively were elements for federal constitutional purposes, and so were

244
245
246

247

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000).
See supranotes 77-78 and accompanying text.
Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2519-26 (2004).
See, e.g., ANTONIN ScALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND

THE LAW

13 (1997).
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subject to the procedural requirements the Constitution attaches to trial of
elements." 248 The last clause of this description clearly casts the "elements"
determination as a procedural question, but this classification is in direct
conflict with the Court's precedent on the matter. Similarly, Justice
Scalia's emphasis on Ring's statement that the statutory aggravators were
"effectively" elements of the crime of capital murder downplayed the
substantive nature of Ring's holding. This approach then allowed Justice
Scalia to conclude that, because Ring did not touch the question of whether
the aggravators listed in the Arizona statute could legitimately serve as
grounds for capital punishment, Ring's rule was not substantive. 249 The
Solicitor General argued in a similar vein that Ring was not substantive
because "[a]fter Ring, Arizona remained free to impose the death penalty on
the same substantive basis as before-i.e., where, as a necessary
precondition, the murder was accompanied by an aggravating
circumstance." 250 Thus, the government suggested that a rule is substantive
only if it bars a state from punishing specific behavior.
But surely this understanding of "substantive" rules is false. As the
Ninth Circuit stated in Summerlin, Ring transformed Arizona's sentencing
aggravators into elements by distinguishing two discrete substantive crimes
of murder: capital and non-capital murder, as determined by the presence
(or absence) of those aggravators.25 1 Then, because Arizona's scheme
failed to provide the requisite procedural safeguards to a criminal defendant
(i.e., the right to jury fact-finding in sentencing), the Court in Ring
commanded Arizona to reconfigure its capital sentencing scheme.252 And
according to Apprendi, the question of whether an aggravator is an element
of a crime or a sentencing factor "is one not of form, but of effect"; an
aggravator will be an element provided that its "finding expose[s] the
defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury's
verdict. '' 253 As applied to Sumnerlin's case, this means that throughout the
guilt phase of the trial Klink effectively defended Summerlin against the
charge of "murder simpliciter," because no facts found at the trial could
render Summerlin eligible for capital punishment. But after Summerlin's
conviction the court sentenced him for capital murder, a charge upon which

24' Schriro, 124 S. Ct. at 2524.
249 Id.

250 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 18-19, Schriro
(No. 03-0526).
251 Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1105 (9th Cir. 2003).
252 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002).
253 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 (2000).
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he did not receive a jury trial. 4 The distinction between the crimes,
however, only became apparent with Ring, which had the effect of barring
Arizona from punishing Summerlin's criminal conduct, as determined by a
jury at his trial, with death.255 As such, Ring effected a substantive shift in
Arizona's criminal law, a point the Ninth Circuit articulated with help from
a quotation borrowed from Justice Scalia.256
Moreover, although it is true, as Justice Scalia wrote, that subsequent
to Ring the Arizona Supreme Court concluded that Ring's rule did not
effect a substantive change in Arizona criminal law, 57 this fact is not at all
relevant. To be sure, both the Arizona State Department of Corrections and
the Solicitor General made this argument; according to Arizona, "[n]either
this Court nor any other federal tribunal has any authority to place a
construction on a state statute different from the one rendered by the highest
court of the State. 258 But while Arizona was correct to note that state court
interpretations of state law are binding, but the question of whether Ring's
rule was substantive or procedural does not turn on state statutory
interpretation.
Rather, it requires an evaluation, based on federal
constitutional law, of Ring's effect on criminal procedure. In fact, the
logical outcome of the state's argument is that federal courts can never
effect substantive changes in state law; as the Solicitor General put it,
"because federal courts do not have the authority to reach authoritative
interpretations of the substance of state criminal prohibitions, federal court
decisions in state criminal cases are never 'substantive' decisions that defy
Teague analysis entirely., 259 But this argument goes too far-for example,
surely Lawrence v. Texas 260 effected a substantive change in the criminal
laws of Texas and all other states that criminalized homosexual
intercourse-and the Court was wise to reject it.
2. Ring Enhanced Fact-findingAccuracy and Was "Implicit in Concept of
OrderedLiberty"
Whatever the merits of the argument that Ring announced a
"substantive" rule for retroactivity purposes, the Ninth Circuit was surely
254 Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1089-90.
255 Ring, 536 U.S. at 603-09.
256

See supranote 180 and accompanying text.

257 Schriro, 124 S. Ct. at 2524 (citing State v. Towery, 64 P.3d 828, 832-33 (Ariz.

2003)).

258 Brief for Petitioner at 19, Schriro (No. 03-0526) (quoting Johnson v. Fankell, 520
U.S. 911, 916 (1997)).
259 Brief for the United States at 8, Schriro (No. 03-0526).
260

539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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correct in holding that Ring satisfied the procedural prong of Teague's
exception to the nonretroactivity presumption. In order to qualify for
retroactive application under this prong, a decision must announce "new
the likelihood of an accurate conviction is
procedures without which
261
seriously diminished.",
Justice Scalia's primary argument against finding that Ring satisfied
the enhanced-accuracy requirement was empirical in nature. Although he
conceded that juries may be more accurate fact-finders than judges, Justice
Scalia observed that the evidence on this issue is far from dispositive.2 62
After noting several scholarly studies that dispute the efficacy of jury
decision-making, Justice Scalia wrote, "[w]hen so many presumably
reasonable minds continue to disagree over whether juries are better
factfinders at all, we cannot confidently say that judicial factfinding
seriously diminishes accuracy. 263 This argument seems reasonable on its
face, but it confronts at least two serious difficulties.
First, although it may be true, in the abstract, that judges are equally
good, or perhaps even better, fact-finders than are juries, Summerlin's own
experience clearly demonstrated the dangers inherent in a blanket
preference for judges as fact-finders. In fact, as Summerlin's brief
observed, English and American courts historically required juries at
criminal trials in order to shield defendants from the danger of "eccentric
specter of the 'eccentric' judge was no abstraction for
judges," and "[t]he
264
Summerlin.
Mr.
The government-restricting function of juries is of course closely
related to a concern with accuracy, albeit not a narrow, fact-based kind of
accuracy. In his brief to the Court, Summerlin argued for a less factual
understanding of the term:
Accuracy... denotes more than the mere absence of error. It also signifies
conformity to the truth or to a standard or model. In this sense, a jury in a criminal
case renders a more "accurate" verdict than a judge because its unanimous decision
more closely reflects public opinion
265regarding the gravity of the defendant's failure to
"conform" to societal "standards."

262

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 313 (1989).
Schriro, 124 S. Ct. at 2524-25.

263

Id. at 2525.

261

264 Brief for Respondent at 34-35, Schriro (No. 03-0526) (citing Duncan v. Louisiana,

391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968)). Indeed, this issue highlights one of the essential problems with
Justice Scalia's approach in Schriro, which is entirely focused on abstract questions about
constitutional rules, and seems completely divorced from the facts of Summerlin's case.
265 Id. at 36 (citing WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 8 (1981)).
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This argument illustrates the second basic problem with Schriro's
approach to accuracy, which is its unduly constricted view of that concept.
Justice Scalia seemed to consider accuracy solely in terms of objective
facts. But while this view of fact-finding accuracy may be perfectly
adequate with respect to the guilt-determination phase of trials, it does not
seem particularly appropriate in sentencing. The Ninth Circuit emphasized
that the aggravating factor at issue in Summerlin's habeas petitionwhether he acted "in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner"may not be found with the kind of empirical accuracy that Justice Scalia
cited. Although Justice Scalia addressed this argument, he did so in a
perfunctory fashion, stating, "the statute here does not condition death
eligibility on whether the offense is heinous, cruel, or depraved as
determined by community standards.'266 This simply begs the question,
though, of how else "heinous, cruel or depraved" can be defined; the terms
possess no fixed, objective meanings, and their definitions will necessarily
vary across communities. As Justice Breyer observed in his dissent, juries
are surely better equipped than judges to make the moral judgments that
such terms require.2 67
The inadequacy of Justice Scalia's conception of accuracy is further
demonstrated by the very authority that he cited to bolster it. As legal
support for his position that Ring did not qualify for retroactive effect,
Justice Scalia relied heavily on DeStefano v. Woods, 268 in which the Court
declined to retroactively apply its ruling in Duncan v. Louisiana extending
the jury trial guarantee to the states. 269 The precedential value of DeStefano
is itself dubious. For one thing, the case predates Teague by more than two
decades. Justice Scalia was therefore on questionable grounds in citing its
approach to retroactivity in the course of applying Teague, which
presumably superseded DeStefano. Moreover, as Summerlin noted, in
Brown v. Louisiana2 70 the Court retroactively applied a Sixth Amendment
rule because "the retroactivity or nonretroactivity of a rule is not
automatically determined by the provision of the Constitution on which the
dictate is based.",271 But more important for the purposes of evaluting
Justice Scalia's Teague test "accuracy" argument is the view of Justice
Harlan. In the very opinion in which he first described the basic contours of
Schriro, 124 S. Ct. at 2526.
Id. at 2528 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
168 Id. at 2525-26; 392 U.S. 631 (1968) (per curiam).
269 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
270 447 U.S. 323 (1980).
271 Brief for Respondent at 40, Schriro (No. 03-0526) (quoting Brown, 447 U.S. at 334
266
267

n.13).
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what later became the Teague test, Justice Harlan wrote that DeStefano
violated the "principle that new rules affecting 'the very integrity of the
fact-finding process' are to be retroactively applied. '272 Thus, the purported
progenitor of the Teague test rejected DeStefano and viewed accuracy in the
more liberal, moral light urged by Summerlin and rejected by Justice Scalia.
Equally unconvincing is Justice Scalia's implicit assumption that Ring
fails to satisfy Justice Harlan's original second requirement for procedural
rule retroactivity because it did not declare a "watershed" rule of criminal
procedure. It is interesting that Justice Scalia failed to even discuss whether
Ring's rule was of "watershed" significance.273 As Arizona observed in its
brief to the Court, the one judge-made rule that is widely agreed to qualify
for this exception to Teague nonretroactivity is the requirement, announced
in Gideon v. Wainwright,274 that courts must appoint counsel for indigent
defendants. 275 According to Arizona's brief, Gideon merits classification as
a "watershed rule" because "Gideon dramatically changed the landscape of
American criminal procedure by requiring states to provide counsel in all
criminal trials involving serious offenses. 2 76
This argument, however, leads nowhere; one could just as easily assert
that Ring v. Arizona and Apprendi v. New Jersey changed the legal
landscape by requiring states to prove all facts necessary for the imposition
of a given sentence to a jury. Indeed, as Summerlin argued, in terms of
historical practice and constitutional grounding "Ring's pedigree is as
impressive as Gideon's."277 Justice Stevens provided substantial support
for exactly this point in Apprendi, where he noted "the novelty of a
legislative scheme that removes the jury from the determination of a fact
that, if found, exposes the criminal defendant to a penalty exceeding the
maximum he would receive if punished according to the facts reflected in
the jury verdict alone., 278 Thus, the historical anomaly in Summerlin's case

272 Id. at 41 (quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 257 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
273 Schriro, 124 S. Ct. at 2519-26.
274 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
275 Brief for Petitioner at 21-22 (No. 03-0526) (citing O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S.

151, 170 (1997); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288,
311-12 (1989)).
276 Id.
277

Brief for Respondent at 42, Schriro (No. 03-0526) (citing Albert W. Alschuler &

Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the CriminalJury in the United States, 61 U. Chm. L.
REv. 867 (1994)).
278 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 482-83 (2000); see also White, supra note
104.
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was not Ring's requirement of jury fact-finding,
but rather Arizona's
279
sentencing scheme, which did not require it.

In addition to the historical arguments it made in favor of considering
Ring a "bedrock" rule, the Ninth Circuit presented a significant
consequentialist justification for this classification. According to the Ninth
Circuit, Arizona's failure to provide a jury during the sentencing phase
constituted a structural error, which meant that the trial had lacked an
element essential to fairness. 280 The Solicitor General argued in response
that the Ring rule was not "structural," but rather should be evaluated under
"harmless error" standard.281 In Schriro, the Solicitor General asserted, "all
of the elements necessary to support respondent's guilt of a crime subject to
the death penalty were found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, with the
single exception of the presence of an aggravating circumstance. 2 82
The disingenuousness of this argument is obvious, its emphasis on the
"single exception" irrelevant. The number of errors present in a trial has no
bearing on whether or not they were structural. The extreme, but logical,
conclusion of this argument would be to term "harmless error" a situation in
which a jury found all of the relevant facts in a trial with the single
exception of guilt, which was determined by the judge. More importantly,
it seems ludicrous to argue that the finding of a sentencing aggravator in a
capital case could ever be "harmless"; that finding quite literally represents
the difference between life and death for the defendant.2 83
Ultimately, the case for the bedrock nature of Ring's rule was made
most clearly, albeit indirectly, by Justice Scalia himself. In Blakely v.
Washington,284 issued on the same day as Schriro, Justice Scalia termed the
right to a jury's determination of essential sentencing factors "no mere
procedural formality, but a fundamental reservation of power in our
constitutional structure., 285 Like Schriro, Blakely addressed the jury's role
in sentencing, and not in determining guilt. 286 It seems clear, then, that the

Court's affirmation of this right in Ring should constitute a "watershed"
279

On the recent development of "determinate sentencing" schemes, see FRANK E.

ZIMRING, GORDON HAWKINS, & SAM KAMIN, PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES

AND YOU'RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA 112-15 (2001).

Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1116-19 (9th Cir. 2003).
281 Brief for the United States at 29, Schriro (No. 03-0526) (citing Neder v. United
States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999)).
282 Id.
283 Moreover, Neder, on which the United States relied, pre-dates Apprendi, so its
280

authority is questionable at best.
284 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
285 Id. at 2358-59.
286 Id. at 2536.
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rule in criminal procedure, thus qualifying for retroactive application under
Teague. The Court's decision not to classify Ring this way owes more to
the defects in the Teague line of cases and the ambiguity of the "watershed"
exception itself than to Summerlin's case.287
3. Ring as a "New Rule"
An even more compelling argument against Justice Scalia's
application of Teague is one that the Ninth Circuit inexplicably rejected:
that Ring did not announce a new rule at all, but merely clarified the
meaning of the Sixth Amendment jury trial guarantee.288 According to
Teague, a rule is new "when it breaks new ground or imposes a new
obligation on the States or the Federal Government., 289 Under this
definition, it is difficult to see how the Ring rule could be considered a new
one, for the obligation that it imposes ostensibly derives from the Sixth
Amendment itself. Indeed, the Solicitor General's amicus brief argued,
"Apprendi's contribution was not to announce a new 'watershed' rule, but
to clarify precisely which facts that enhance punishment must be submitted
to the jury and which facts need not be. 29 ° Even more tellingly, in
disputing the substantive nature of the Ring rule the Solicitor General
asserted that
The principle that a defendant has the right to a trial by jury on every essential
element of the offense was established long before Apprendi or Ring. Apprendi was
essentially a line-drawing decision that developed the standard for determining how to
distinguish between facts that must be submitted to a jury and facts that may be
decided by the judge. Ring, in turn, simply applied Apprendi to Arizona's capital
sentencing procedure. Ring and Apprendi are accordingly refinements of long-settled
legal principles. Although such refinements may be important, they do not alter 291
our
understanding of the 'bedrock procedural elements' that are essential to a fair trial.

The Solicitor General's statement seems a reasonable description of
Ring and Apprendi, and it comports with the history of the Court's Sixth
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In fact, in the fifteen years since Teague was decided, the Supreme Court has yet to

identify a single case (with the historical exception of Gideon v. Wainwright) that qualifies
as a Teague "watershed." Tonya G. Newman, Comment, Summerlin v. Stewart and Ring
Retroactivity, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 755, 767 (2004). Even this concession is trivial, as it
has not, to my knowledge, been applied in a single case, which is not surprising, considering
that Gideon was decided roughly a quarter-century before Teague.
288 Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1109 (9th Cir. 2003).
289 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989) (plurality opinion).
290 Brief for the United States at 25, Schriro (No. 03-0526). This passage appears in the
briefs section arguing against the retroactive application of Ring under the second,
procedural exception to Teague's nonretroactivity presumption. Id.
291 Id.at 9.
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Amendment jurisprudence. Nevertheless, as Summerlin observed, Arizona
simply assumed that Ring's rule was new, without actually demonstrating
why this was so. 292 In fact, this was true of all of the briefs from Arizona's
amici except the Solicitor General's. 293 Summerlin, however, argued that
Ring's rule was not new at all, citing both the Solicitor General's amicus
brief and Justice Stevens' Walton dissent, with its substantial discussion of
the history of the jury guarantee in capital sentencing. 294
Still, there remains one primary hurdle confronting a proponent of the
theory that Ring and Apprendi did not announce a new rule: Ring's
overruling of Walton v. Arizona suggests that Ring declared a new
constitutional principle.295 In its reply brief, Arizona made this point,
stating that just as Walton announced a new constitutional rule, Ring
296
announced a Sixth Amendment rule that directly contradicted Walton's.
But this formulation, confident though it sounds, raises a key question:
what, exactly, was the Walton rule that the Court rejected in Ring?
As Summerlin's brief noted, in Ring "[t]he Court acknowledged that
the factual premise underlying its decision in Walton-that a jury
conviction of first-degree murder in Arizona automatically made the
defendant eligible for a sentence of death-was incorrect., 297 In effect, the
presumptive "Walton rule" (that Arizona's sentencing scheme was
constitutionally permissible) never existed, because Walton erroneously
approved a scheme that did not exist. This mistake was perpetuated when
the Court explicitly declined to overrule Walton in Apprendi.298 Thus,
Summerlin observed that the Arizona Supreme Court later "refuted the
Apprendi majority's statement.., that juries in capital cases had 'found the
defendant guilty of all the elements of an offense which carries as its
maximum penalty the sentence of death."' 299 Contrary to Arizona's
assertion-unchallenged by the Ninth Circuit, and unexamined by Justice
Scalia-that Ring announced a new rule, the stronger case rests with the
side asserting that Ring merely restored a proper understanding of the Sixth
Amendment's jury trial guarantee.
Near the conclusion of his Schriro opinion, Justice Scalia wrote that,
despite the significance of the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee, "it
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299

Brief for Respondent at 18 n.5, Schriro, (No. 03-0526).
Id.
Id. at 17-18.
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 603 (2002).
Brief for Respondent at 3, Schriro (No. 03-0526).
Id. at 13 (citing Ring, 536 U.S. at 603).
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 496-97 (2000).
Reply Brief for Petitioner at 5 (No. 03-0526) (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 497).
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does not follow that, when a criminal defendant has had a full trial and one
round of appeals in which the State faithfully applied the Constitution as we
understood it at the time," 30 0 the Court should allow him to benefit from a
subsequently announced constitutional rule. The key phrase in this passage
is "at the time." With these words, Justice Scalia at once acknowledged
that the Court's pre-Ring understanding of the Sixth Amendment was no
longer operative, and also displayed a complete disregard for the originalist
approach to Constitutional interpretation of which he has long been the
fiercest and most articulate proponent.30 1
Central to the originalist project is the quasi-Platonist idea that there
exists one true, unchanging interpretation of the Constitutional text. Justice
Scalia clearly enunciated his originalist approach to the jury trial right in his
concurring opinion in Apprendi. There, he argued that Justice Breyer's
policy-based dissent
proceeds on the erroneous and all-too-common assumption that the Constitution
means what we think it ought to mean. It does not; it means what it says. And the
guarantee that '[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to...
trial, by an impartial jury,' has no intelligible content unless it means that all the facts
to subject the defendant to a legally prescribed punishment
which must exist in order 302
must be found by the jury.

But just four years later, in Schriro, Justice Scalia alluded to evolving
constitutional norms and essentially adopted a "living" constitutional
perspective, a viewpoint for which he has in the past reserved some of his
harshest broadsides.30 3 If there is, as Justice Scalia has traditionally
insisted, just one true "original" understanding of the Constitution, and if
reaching that understanding is the ultimate goal of constitutional
adjudication, then it is unclear why any weight should be accorded to prior
decisions (e.g., Walton) that the Court later determines were inconsistent
with this proper understanding of the Constitution. Indeed, if the rule
announced in Ring expresses the original meaning of the Constitution-and
since Justice Scalia joined Ring, this is presumably his belief-then it is
difficult to see how that rule can be considered "new" in any meaningful
sense. It is particularly ironic that Justice Scalia reached the dubious result
that Ring announced a new rule in the course of applying the Teague test,
which is itself devoid of constitutional support. That the Teague test was
formulated by Justice O'Connor, the Court's consummate pragmatist (and
300 Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2526 (2004) (emphasis added).
301 See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 247, at 37-41.
302 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 499 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI)

(alteration in original).
303 See SCALIA, supra note 247, at 41-47.
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former legislator), is not at all surprising; that it has been unquestioningly
adopted by Justice Scalia, the consistent promoter, in both scholarship and
jurisprudence, of a rigorous and principled theory of constitutionalism, is
inexplicable.
Furthermore, the perpetuation of Teague's broad conception of what
constitutes a "new" rule threatens to narrow the availability of meaningful
habeas relief almost to extinction. Whereas Justice Harlan thought that the
concept of "new rules" should be narrowly construed in order to allow
retroactive application in the habeas context of most Supreme Court
holdings, Teague and its progeny have effected a remarkable expansion of
the "new rule" field. 304 This unfortunate result is a consequence of the
30 5
theory of habeas corpus that Justice O'Connor first articulated in Teague.
In her view, the costs that federal grants of habeas impose on state courts
are an essential consideration in defining the writ's scope. 30 6 But while
Justice Harlan, too, considered this to be a relevant concern of habeas
adjudication, he did not elevate it to the central position that it occupies in
Justice O'Connor's conception. Instead, he listed federalism as one
relevant consideration among many.30 7 This view is surely the correct one,
because as Black's Law Dictionary states, historically, "[t]he primary
function of the writ is to release from unlawful imprisonment., 308 In
Teague, however, Justice O'Connor transformed a writ that is chiefly
concerned with the vindication of individual rights into a device for
ensuring the proper state-federal balance of power. Such renovations are
characteristic of the Rehnquist Court's 3approach
to individual constitutional
09
rights in the capital sentencing context.
C. SHOULD TEAGUE GOVERN?

Finally, Schriro demonstrates several of the reasons why the Court
should retire Teague as the primary authority in the area of habeas
retroactivity. First, the Teague test derives from dicta in a plurality opinion
signed by only four justices, so its precedential value is open to question.
In addition, although Teague purports to announce a clear retroactivity
framework, it relies on terms that are inherently vague, and does little or
304
305

306
307

308
309

See Goldstein, supranote 7, at 401-10.
See supranote 287.
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989).
Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 689 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 491 (abr. 6th ed. 1991).
See Stephen Reinhardt, The Anatomy of an Execution: Fairness vs. "Process," 74

N.Y.U. L. REv. 313 (1999) (arguing that the Court's recent death penalty jurisprudence overemphasizes process at the expense of rights).
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nothing to clarify them. Lastly, there exist no compelling policy arguments
for prohibiting Ring's retroactive application, and a number of reasons in
favor of it.
1. Is Teague Binding?
In his brief, Summerlin cited Ballew v. Georgia310 for the proposition
that fact-finding accuracy has always been an important justification for
requiring juries in criminal trials. 3 1' However, as Arizona observed in its
reply, "Summerlin's quotes from a portion of the Ballew opinion are from
two Justices only. 3 12 Of course, this argument points up the dubious
precedential value of Teague itself. Although most of the Court signed onto
the result in Teague, Justice O'Connor was unable to persuade a majority to
support her adaptation of Justice Harlan's retroactivity framework.
Moreover, Teague itself misread the Justice Harlan theories that it allegedly
advanced.313 Admittedly, the Court's repeated reliance on Teague has
invested it with some degree of authority. But the fact that the test
possesses no true weight from a stare decisis perspective should make it
that much easier for the Court ultimately to reject it.
2. Is Teague Internally Coherent?
The central problem with the Teague test is one that plagues many
such multi-factor balancing tests: it pretends to generally applicable
objectivity, but the vagueness of its terms precludes consistent application.
The indeterminacy of this test is self-evident: its three factors are nebulous
and not susceptible to objective measurement; there is no clear formula for
weighing the factors; and a reviewing court may apply the test to virtually
any constitutional claim. Thus, every aspect of the test suffers from acute
ambiguity,
particularly
its
"new
rules"
category
and
the
substantive/procedural bifurcation of such rules.314 As noted above, Teague
and its progeny fail to define "new rules" in a way that enables consistent
application.31 5 Further, Teague relied heavily on a binary categorizationopposing "substantive" versus "procedural" rules-that is notoriously
slippery,316 and Teague itself did nothing to resolve the terminological
310

435 U.S. 223 (1978).

311Brief for Respondent at 34 (No. 03-0526).
312 Reply Brief for Petitioner at 16 (No. 03-0526).
313 See Bryant, supranote 5.
314 See supra Part ILA.4.b.

315 See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
316 See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465-66 (1965); see also Gillian T.
DiFilippo, Comment, Tossing Its Hat in the Ring: With Summerlin v. Stewart, the Ninth

SUPREME COURTREVIEW

[Vol. 95

vagueness.
The actual permeability of Teague's ostensibly rigid
substantive/procedural split is particularly clear in the Ninth Circuit's
Summerlin decision, which classified Ring as both substantive and
procedural.3 17 Similarly, the explanatory power of the "watershed" concept
is dubious, as illustrated by Justice O'Connor's reference (via Justice
Harlan) to the equally ambiguous term "bedrock" in her definition of the
"watershed" decision category.318 Such impressionistic terms do not lend
themselves to uniform application.
Even more troubling are the logical consequences of a literal
application of Teague's test. Strictly interpreted, Teague's test commands
that, even where a habeas plaintiff succeeds in convincing the Court to
announce a new rule, if that rule does not qualify for either of Teague's
retroactivity requirements, then that plaintiff would be unable to benefit
from the rule. Imagine, for example, that Timothy Ring had convinced the
Court to invalidate Arizona's capital sentencing scheme in a federal habeas
corpus petition based on Apprendi, rather than on direct appeal. Imagine
next that the Court decided, as it did in Schriro, that Ring's rule did not
warrant retroactive application. Such a sequence would mean that, because
the new rule took effect after Ring's conviction became final, Ring's
sentence would stand. This result is plainly ridiculous, but Teague
commands it.
3. Is Teague Even Necessary?
The fundamental flaw at the core of the Teague and its progeny is that
they seek to solve a non-existent problem. Retroactivity was never a vexing
issue until the Court decided, sua sponte, that it needed to formulate rules
governing its operation.319 Indeed, as one of the great students of the
common law tradition wrote, "[j]udicial decisions have had retrospective
operation for near a thousand years. 320 Moreover, Teague actually

Circuit Exposes the Harmful Ambiguity Caused by Ring v. Arizona, 53 CATH. U. L. REv.
1091, 1121 (2003-04) (noting that "the Supreme Court's failure to classify its own rule [in
Ring] ...caused the confusion" regarding its retroactivity).
317 See supra Part II.E.
318 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989) (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401
U.S. 667, 693-94 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
319 Linda Meyer, "Nothing We Say Matters":Teague andNew Rules, 61 U. CHI.L. REv.
423, 427 (1994) ("Before 1965, the Supreme Court assumed all of its decisions should apply
retroactively.").
320 Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 372 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting). A
default presumption of retroactivity seems particularly natural in the habeas context.
Incarceration is an ongoing process that imposes costs on both the prisoner and the state.
Thus, it is in both parties' interests not to maintain incarcerations once their legal
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exacerbates the problem that it purports to alleviate. Although in Teague
Justice O'Connor expressed great concern for the authority of state courts,
and claimed that the Teague test would lessen tension between federal and
state judiciaries, the test's vagueness winds up producing more
uncertainty-and thus more extensive federal judicial review-than
obtained before Teague. Such perverse results often flow from complex,
multi-pronged balancing tests like Teague's, a fact that may explain, at least
in part, the durability of most of the Warren Court's expansive rules of
criminal procedure: aside from their (often-contested) substantive merits,
the Warren Court's rules were actually more efficient, and more protective
of federalism, than the purportedly states-rights-based rules that they
replaced.32 1 Similarly, Teague, although ostensibly designed in order to
further federalist concerns, may actually impair federalism and reduce
efficiency by increasing uncertainty.
4. Teague Conflicts with Sound Public Policy
Finally, the Teague test-both generally and as applied in Schriro-is
a failure from the perspective of public policy. In overturning Summerlin's
death sentence, the Ninth Circuit persuasively argued that, on purely public
policy grounds, Ring should be retroactive. 2
Judge Reinhardt's
concurrence is particularly eloquent in its description of the salutary realworld consequences of applying Ring retroactively.323 As Judge Reinhardt
argued, this result would further the interests of justice and fairness.324
Specifically, such a holding would ensure that coincidences in the timing of
arrests and convictions do not determine the ultimate dispositions of habeas
foundations have disappeared. Although a habeas petitioner should bear the burden of
demonstrating that his imprisonment lacks a legal basis, a showing of the relevant law's
current unconstitutionality should suffice.
321 The late Professor Ely observed that this federalism-based argument for clear rules
was one important justification for the Court's decision in Gideon v. Wainwright, because
"the previously prevailing 'special circumstances rule [for court-appointed counsel],' though
requiring counsel on fewer occasions, in fact had repeatedly resulted in messy and frictiongenerating factual inquiries into every case." ELY, supra note 230, at 125. Professor Ely
was particularly well-situated to attest to the role this argument played in Gideon, having
invented it himself as a summer associate at Arnold, Fortas and Porter. ANTHONY LEWIS,
GIDEON'S TRUMPET 124 (1964). Likewise, Justice Scalia has previously expressed a strong
preference for bright-line rules, as opposed to discretionary standards, in judicial opinionwriting. See Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHi. L. REv. 1175 (1989).
322 Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1120-21 (9th Cir. 2003).
323 Id. at 1124 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
324 Id. at 1122 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). Moreover, Ring's retroactive application
would have a minimal impact on state courts, for as Justice Breyer noted, it would affect
only about 110 death-row inmates nationally. Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2530
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
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petitions .325 Given the vagaries of individual states' criminal justice
systems, a defendant who committed a crime at time TI could see his
conviction become final after one who committed the same crime at a later
T2. But, applying the rule promulgated in Schriro, if the Supreme Court
issued a decision regarding the Sixth Amendment during the period
between the final dispositions of the two defendants' appeals, the later
criminal (but earlier convict) could benefit from the new law, while his peer
could not. Is this equity, in any real sense?
Finally, Justice Scalia's opinion raises several fundamental
jurisprudential questions. Why should the Court decline to correct the
consequences of its mistakes? As Judge Reinhardt noted, the Court should
be applauded for rectifying its erroneous decision in Walton.326
Unfortunately, by declining to apply Ring retroactively, the Court
effectively punished Summerlin for its own blunders. And why, in the
interest of "comity," should the Court defer to constitutionally flawed state
laws? This seems like the reductio ad absurdum of doctrinaire federalism.
It also raises the question: "may the state now deliberately execute persons
knowing that their death sentences were arrived at in a manner that violated
their constitutional rights? '327 In Schriro, Justice Scalia answered this
question with a resounding "yes. 328
VI. CONCLUSION
For all of the above reasons, Schriro v. Summerlin, while less
celebrated than other decisions from the Court's 2003 term, is potentially as
consequential as any of its more prominent companions. Unfortunately,
these consequences will almost surely be negative. Schriro constitutes a
striking abdication of judicial responsibility, and its sloppy reasoning and
misuse of precedent compare quite unfavorably to the thorough, reasoned
Ninth Circuit opinion it overturned. Its feebleness also presents a stark
contrast to Blakely v. Washington, a principled decision written by Justice
Scalia in which precedent, constitutional text, and internal logic prevailed
over the potentially disruptive results that provoked Justice O'Connor's

325 Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1124-25 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).

326 Id. at 1122 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
327 Id. at 1124 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
328 It is possible that Summerlin could suffer the consequences of Justice Scalia's
decision yet again, as Schriro would likely preclude a habeas petition based on Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). Atkins barred the execution of the mentally retarded, but like
Ring, it was decided in 2002. Id. at 321. Conversely, an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim based on Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) could succeed. Thus,
Summerlin may ultimately benefit from the sheer volume of irregularities in his case.
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dissent. 32 9 Even more important than the qualitative divergence between
these decisions is their substantive conflict: courts have already cited
Schriro in limiting Blakely's scope.330 Perhaps this is no accident; Justice
Scalia may have decided Schriro as he did in order to win one of the
Court's "conservatives" to his side in Blakely. 33' Even if true, this would
hardly excuse Schriro.
Ultimately, it is odd that the Court decided Schriro at all, let alone as
broadly it did. As always, the Justices could have denied certiorari. Or
they could have ruled narrowly on the facts of Summerlin's case, denying
his petition because Ring allows judges to find the facts of prior
convictions, as happened with Summerlin. Instead, the Court unnecessarily
issued a blanket rule limiting Ring, Apprendi, and untold future decisions.
The Court thus deprived not only Summerlin, but also future habeas
petitioners, of basic protections afforded them by the Constitution. Schriro
is a jurisprudential travesty and a public policy failure, and the Court should
abandon it at the first opportunity.
Marc E. Johnson

329 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2548-50 (2004) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
330 See, e.g., United States v. Price, 400 F.3d 844, .845-46 (10th Cir. 2005); Morris v.
United States, 333 F. Supp. 2d 759, 769 (C.D. Ill. 2004); United States v. Traeger, 325 F.
Supp. 2d 860, 864 (N.D. Ill. 2004). Likewise, every circuit to address the issue has relied on
Schriro in declining to give retroactive effect to the Court's recent extension of Blakely in
United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). Douglas Berman, Sentencing Law and
Policy, Apr. 9, 2005, at http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencinglawand_policy/2005/04/
retroactivityc.html (last visited April 15, 2005); see, e.g., Guzman v. United States, No. 032446, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 5700, at *6-11 (2d Cir. Apr. 8, 2005) ("[Schriro's]reasoning
applies [to Booker] a fortiori."); Humphress v. United States, 398 F.3d 855, 863 (6th Cir.
2005) ("Schriro's reasoning applies with equal force to Booker."); McReynolds v. United
States, 397 F.3d 479, 480 (7th Cir. 2005) ("Although the Supreme Court did not address the
retroactivity question in Booker, its decision in Schriro v. Summerlin... is all but conclusive
on this point.").
331 Justice Breyer's opposition to Blakely was all but assured by his involvement in
crafting the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, whose constitutionality Blakely cast into doubt.
Justice Thomas was the only member of the Court to join Justice Scalia in both opinions, and
it does not seem too far-fetched to imagine that he was induced to join Blakely by the
knowledge that Schriro would limit its impact. For more on such "realist" interpretations of
Schriro, see Professor Douglas Berman's comments at Sentencing Law and Policy, July 14,
2004,
at http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencinglawandpolicy/2004/07/thoughts_
and ho (last visited April 2, 2005).
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